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Abstract
People frequently use the world-wide web to find their
most preferred item among a large range of options. We
call this task preference-based search. The most com-
mon tool for preference-based search on the WWW to-
day obtains users’ preferences by asking them to fill in
a form. It then returns a list of items that most closely
match these preferences. Recently, several researchers
have proposed tools for preference-based search that
elicit preferences from the critiques a user actively
makes on examples shown to them. We carried out a
user study in order to compare the performance of tradi-
tional preference-based search tools using form-filling
with two different versions of an example-critiquing
tool. The results show that example critiquing achieves
almost three times the decision accuracy, while requir-
ing only slightly higher interaction effort.
Introduction
People often use the world wide web to search for their most
preferred item, such as a computer, a camera, an apartment,
or a flight. However, keyword search is often too imprecise,
returning hundreds or thousands of results that users cannot
practically process themselves. Instead, it is more effective
to guide the search with user preferences, expressed as pre-
ferred values on the attributes of an item. Then a database
system can find the ideal item based on these preferences.
We call this task preference-based search.
For structured items, the most common way to obtain the
user’s preferences is to ask the user to fill in a form or to
answer a set of elicitation questions. Such a process is used,
for example, when searching for flights on the most popular
travel web sites,1 2 or when searching for apartments, used
cars or health insurance using the Swiss site Comparis3. The
comparis site (see Figure 1) presents the users with a form on
which they fill in their preferences, and then shows (in pos-
sibly many pages) all results that satisfy these preferences.
The user can go back to the form to modify the preferences
and obtain different search results. We call this preference
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Figure 1: Example of preference-based search using the
form-filling approach.
elicitation approach the form-filling approach. It has been
used in essentially unchanged form for years, despite stud-
ies such as (Equity 2000) which showed that only 18% of
users feel that they find the best solution using such a tool.
When the user starts a search, she typically has only
few well-defined preferences. According to behavioral
studies (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson 1993; Slovic 1995;
Tversky 1996), many of the preferences are constructed
when considering specific examples. Thus, with a form-
filling approach, the preference model may be quite com-
plete, but does not guide the system to find the most accurate
results. Similar effects were also documented for collabora-
tive filtering, where allowing users to rate items of their own
choice led to more accurate results than making them rate
items selected by the system to optimize coverage (McNee
et al. 2003).
It is thus reasonable to expect more accurate search results
if preferences are expressed on users’ own initiative. More-
over, people often express preferences as reactions on the
example solutions shown to them, such as ”I like this dig-
ital camera, but find something less expensive.” Therefore,
researchers have proposed to elicit user preferences as cri-
tiques on examples, and use this feedback to direct the next
search cycle. This approach, termed example-critiquing, is
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Figure 2: The example-critiquing interaction model. The
dark box is the computer’s action and the other boxes show
actions of the user.
Figure 3: Isy-travel is an example-critiquing tool for plan-
ning business trips. Here the user is planning a one-day trip
from Geneva to Hamburg. The preference model is shown at
the bottom, and the user can make critiques by clicking on
features of the example currently shown.
illustrated in Figure 2. A difficulty is that since the initia-
tive to express critiques lies with the users, they must be
motivated to express them. A major contribution of this
paper is a method for generating suggestions that give the
user an idea of the opportunities that other options may
present. Through a user study, we confirm the advantages
of example-critiquing over form-filling, and the importance
of suggestions for example-critiquing. Results show that de-
cision accuracy can be increased from 25% for form-filling
to 70% for example-critiquing.
Related Work
To our knowledge, the earliest work on example-critiquing
has been reported by (Tou et al. 1982), and has been picked
up again in the late 1990s by several researchers. Figure
3 shows an example taken from Isy-Travel, a commercial
tool for business travelers (Pu, Faltings, & Torrens 2004).
Here, the user is shown options that best match the current
preference model. The idea is that an example is either the
most preferred one, or there are some aspects a user wants
to improve. Thus, on any of the examples, any attribute can
be selected as a basis for critiquing. For instance, if the ar-
rival time is too late, then this can be critiqued. The cri-
tique then becomes an additional preference in the model.
This form of example-critiquing has been proposed by var-
ious researchers, starting with the ATA system of Linden
et al. (Linden, Hanks, & Lesh 1997) and SmartClient (Pu
& Faltings 2000), and more recently with incremental cri-
tiquing (Kevin McCarthy 2005).
In another form of example-critiquing, search proceeds as
navigation from one example to another, where the current
example is considered to be the most preferred at that point.
Critiques of the current example then lead to another exam-
ple that improves on the aspect that the user has critiques
while being as similar as possible to the current example.
Performance can be improved by providing users with com-
pound critiques (Reilly et al. 2004). This form of example-
critiquing was first proposed in the FindMe systems (Burke,
Hammond, & Young 1997; Burke 2002), and more recently
also used in the ExpertClerk system (Shimazu 2001) and in
dynamic critiquing (McCarthy et al. 2005).
Recently, researchers have considered whether example-
critiquing should present the user only with examples that
match the current preferences best, or with a diversity of op-
tions that show the available choices and thus stimulate the
user to express more preferences. Such suggestions were
first considered by Linden et al. (Linden, Hanks, & Lesh
1997), and subsequently by other researchers who were
studying the potential need for diversity, for example (Shi-
mazu 2001; McSherry 2002; Smyth & McGinty 2003;
McGinty & Smyth 2003). Suggestions can be used with any
interface design that allows incremental revision of prefer-
ences.
We now describe the techniques for example-critiquing
and suggestion generation in more detail, and show a tool
called FlatFinder that implements the various example-
critiquing techniques on an apartment database. We used
this tool to compare the performance of the different meth-
ods with real users.
Implementing example-critiquing
In this paper, we consider example-critiquing with an ex-
plicit preference model. It is an iterative process of show-
ing examples, eliciting critiques and refining the preference
model. Thus, the essential issues concern preference mod-
eling and the generation of examples to display. We address
both issues in turn, focusing on strategies for generating sug-
gestions.
Modeling Items and Preferences
We assume that items are modelled by a fixed set of n at-
tributes A = {A1, .., An} that each take values in associated
domains D1, .., Dn. Domains can be qualitative, consisting
of an enumerated set of possibilities, or numeric. Each op-
tion o is characterized by the values a1(o), ..., an(o) of the
attributes.
The user’s preferences are assumed to be defined on in-
dividual attributes4 and independent of one another:
4For preferences over a combination of attributes, such as the
total travel time in a journey, we assume that the model includes
additional attributes that model these combinations.
Definition 1 A preference r is an order relation ¹r of the
values of an attribute a; ∼r expresses that two values are
equally preferred. A preference model R is a set of prefer-
ences {r1, .., rm}.
As a preference r always applies to the same attribute az ,
we simplify the notation and apply¹r and∼r to the options
directly: o1 ≺r o2 iff az(o1) ≺r az(o2). We use ≺r to
indicate that ¹r holds but not ∼r.
For a practical preference-based search tool, it is imprac-
tical to model the order relations as such. Instead, it is more
convenient to express them by a numerical penalty (or cost)
function:
Definition 2 A penalty function c, dk → <+, maps from an
attribute ak to a number that gives a penalty(cost) of that
attribute value to the user such that whenever o1 Âri o2 (o1
is preferred to o2), ci(o1) < ci(o2).
We assume that the penalty functions correctly express the
user’s ceteris paribus preferences, i.e. that for any pair of
options o1 and o2 that are identical in all preferences ex-
cept preference ri, the user prefers o1 over o2 if and only if
ci(s1) < ci(s2).
An overall ranking of options can be obtained by combin-
ing the penalty functions for all stated preferences. In our
systems, we combine them using a weighted sum, which
corresponds well with standard multi-attribute utility the-
ory (Keeney & Raiffa 1976). Thus, if Rc is the set of the
penalty functions, we compute the costC(o) =
∑
ci∈Rc wi ·
ci(o). Option o1 is preferred over option o2 whenever it has
a lower cost, i.e. C(o1) < C(o2).
Note that a user will not state preferences in a numeri-
cally precise function, but only qualitatively. We map these
qualitative statements into parameterized functions that are
standardized to fit average users. These are chosen with re-
spect to the application domain.
For example, in travel planning there are attributes re-
lating to time. Thus, the system would provide functions
to characterize ”later than x” or ”earlier than x” by graded
step functions that penalize times that significantly violate
the preference. Other functions would allow to express air-
line preference by a function that gives a penalty to all but a
certain value of an airline attribute. More details about pref-
erence modeling for example-critiquing are discussed in (Pu
& Faltings 2004).
Generating Optimal Examples
Preference-based search looks for the option that best sat-
isfies the preference model among some well-defined set of
choices. This can be a fixed database of options, such as in
the apartment search example we will discuss later, or it can
be constructed through a configuration system, as in a travel
planning application.
In the first case, the best options can be found by sorting
the database items according to their cost. This is known
as the top-k query in the database community (Fagin 1998).
In the second case, optimization algorithms such as branch-
and-bound can be used to find the best options during the
configuration process.
Note that as users’ qualitative preferences are mapped into
standardized functions, the resulting cost function is inaccu-
rate and thus results in an inaccurate ordering. A common
approach in many web search applications is to compensate
for this inaccuracy by showing not just one, but a set of k
options. Faltings et al. in (Faltings, Torrens, & Pu 2004)
show that given a bound on the difference between the stan-
dardized and a user’s actual penalty function, it is possible to
compute a minimum k such that the user can find the truly
best option among this set of k possibilities. Interestingly,
while k grows with the inaccuracy of the functions and the
number of preferences, it is independent of the total num-
ber of options available, so that the approach scales even for
search in very large collections.
The Need for Suggestions
In an example-critiquing interaction, user’s preferences are
volunteered, not elicited. This means that users are never
forced to answer questions about preferences they do not yet
possess.
We can expect users to state additional preference as long
as they perceive them to lead to a better solution. The
process ends when users can no longer see potential im-
provements by stating additional preferences and have thus
reached an optimum. However, this could be a local opti-
mum. For example, a user looking for a notebook computer
might start looking for a low price. Assume that all cheap
models weigh about 3 kg. If only those are presented, they
will all have about the same weight, and it may not occur to
her to look for lighter models. The influence of the current
examples prevents the user from refocussing the search in
another direction. It is called the anchoring effect (Tversky
1974) in behavioral decision theory.
Several authors have proposed to improve the examples
shown to users by suggesting items that can potentially bring
the user out of such a local optimum (Linden, Hanks, & Lesh
1997; Smyth & McGinty 2003; Shimazu 2001; McSherry
2002; McGinty & Smyth 2003). They have used various
heuristic strategies such as showing examples with extreme
values in certain attributes, or generally ensuring a certain
diversity.
However, the motivation for suggestions is to make a user
state additional preferences. We can assume that the user is
minimizing her own effort and will add preferences to the
model only when she expects them to have an impact on the
solutions. This is the case when:
• the user can see several options that differ in a possible
preference, and
• these options are relevant, i.e. they are reasonable
choices, and
• they are not already optimal.
Otherwise, stating an additional preference is irrelevant:
when all options would evaluate the same way or when the
preference only has an effect on options that would not be
eligible anyway, stating it would be wasted effort. This has
led us to the following principle, which we call the look-
ahead principle, as a basis for our model-based suggestion
strategy:
Suggestions should not be optimal under the current
preference model, but should provide a high likelihood
of optimality when an additional preference is added.
This is a heuristic principle based on assumptions about
human behavior that we cannot prove. However, using sug-
gestions is justified by the fact that it works very well in user
studies, as we report later in this paper.
Model-Based Suggestion Strategy
Our strategy of choosing suggestions is model-based be-
cause the current preference model guides the selection of
examples to stimulate the expression of additional prefer-
ences.
Recall that preferences are modeled by standardized func-
tions that correctly reflect the preference order of individual
attribute values but may be numerically inaccurate. When
looking for the best solution, we can compensate for this in-
accuracy by showing a set of possibilities. However, when
generating suggestions we would like to use a model that
is not sensitive to this numerical error. We thus use the
qualitative combination concepts of dominance and Pareto-
optimality:
Definition 3 An option o is dominated by an option o′ with
respect to R if and only if for all ri ∈ R, o ¹ri o′ and at
least one rj ∈ R, o ≺rj o′. We write o ≺R o′. We can also
say that o is dominated, without specifying o′.
Note that we use the same symbol ≺ for both individual
preferences and sets of preferences.
Definition 4 An option o is Pareto-optimal (PO) if and only
if it is not dominated by any other option.
Pareto-optimality is the strongest concept that would be ap-
plicable regardless of the numerical details of the penalty
functions.
In our applications, users initially state only a subset R of
their true preference model R. When a preference is added,
dominated options with respect to R can become Pareto-
optimal. The following observation is the basis for eval-
uating the likelihood that a dominated option will become
Pareto-optimal:
Proposition 1 A dominated option o′ with respect to R be-
comes Pareto-optimal with respect to R ∪ ri (a new pref-
erence ri is added), if and only if o′ is strictly better with
respect to ri than all options that currently dominate it:
o′ Âri o, ∀ o ∈ O+R(o′).
where we use the concept of dominating set: given one op-
tion o, the set of all options that dominate it: O+R(o) = {o′ ∈
O : o′ ÂR o}. We write O+(o) if it is clear from the context
which is the set R of preferences we are considering.
Proposition 1 provides a heuristic for implementing the
look-ahead principle: choose suggestions that have the high-
est likelihood of breaking all dominance relations with op-
tions in its dominating set when a new preference is added.
Letting Pai be the probability that a user has a preference
on attribute ai, we consider the probability pd that it makes
option o escape dominance by another option o+:
pd(o, o+) = 1−
∏
ai∈Au
(1− Paiδi(o, o+))
where o+ ∈ O+(o), the dominating set of o, and δi is a
heuristic estimation of the probability that o is better than
o+ according to a hidden preference on attribute ai, which
could breaking the dominance relation.
For attributes with numeric values, we use a normalized
difference for interval domains: the chances that a new pref-
erence will treat o1 and o2 differently is directly proportional
to the difference between their values. For qualitative at-
tributes, it is sufficient to detect if attributes are different: in
this case there are equal chances that o1 will be preferred
over o2 and vice versa so that δ = 0.5. If the values are the
same, the dominance relation cannot be broken by a prefer-
ence on this attribute and so δ = 0.
For avoiding dominance, we need to determine the proba-
bility than an option breaks the domination of all dominating
options (i.e. become Pareto-optimal), not just one of them.
Since a new preference is always stated on some attribute,
this means that there has to be one attribute where all the
dominating options have different values than the sugges-
tion. For interval domains, we assume that user preferences
are monotone, so that the requirement is that the attribute
value in the suggestion has be lower or higher than in all
options of the dominating set. We use δi(o,O+) to denote
the analogous distance to δi, but to the closest value of any
dominating option.
The probability of breaking all the dominance relations
simultaneously by stating one new preference is then:
pd(o,O+) = 1−
∏
ai∈Au
(1− Paiδi(o,O+)) (1)
If we assume that the user has only one hidden preference,
we can use the following simplification:
pd(o,O+) =
∑
ai∈Au
Paiδi(o,O
+) (2)
which is also a good approximation when the probabilities
for additional preferences are small.
Following the lookahead principle, the options for which
pd(o,O+) is greatest are chosen as the best suggestions.
Example
As an example to illustrate the various approaches, consider
selecting a flight among the following set of options:
fare arrival airport airline
o1 250 14:00 INT B
o2 300 9:00 INT A
o3 350 17:30 CITY B
o4 400 12:30 CITY B
o5 550 18:30 CITY B
o6 600 8:30 CITY A
For simplicity, assume that options are modelled by just 4
attributes: fare, arrival time, departure airport, and the air-
line.
Initially, the user starts with a preference for the lowest
price. Assume that the user also has two other, hidden pref-
erences:
• arrive by 12:00;
• leave from the CITY airport, which is much closer than
the INTernational airport.
The best choice for this user will be o4 which gives a rea-
sonable tradeoff among the objectives.
In a form-filling or wizzard approach, the tool might also
ask the user for a preference on the airline. Even though
she does not have any preference on the airline, she might
believe that airline A operates more flights from the CITY
airport and thus formulate a means objective for airline A.
When this preference is added to the others, it now makes
options o2 or even o6 the most attractive, thus keeping the
user from finding her best choice. We believe that this effect
is responsible for the poor performance of form-filling in the
user studies we report later in this paper.
Now consider an example-critiquing approach. Given the
initial preference on price, the tool will start by showing only
option o1. In a tool based on navigation without an explicit
preference model, the tool uses the current best example as
the starting point and finds the one that is closest to it while
also satisfying the user’s critique. In this case, the user might
first critique the fact that the arrival time is too late, leading
to o2, and then the fact that the departure is from the IN-
Ternational airport, leading to o6 as the most similar option
leaving from the CITY airport. How, the user might critique
the fact that this option is too expensive, and get back to o2.
In this cycle, the best option, o4, will never be discovered,
since it requires a tradeoff among the different preferences.
The importance of such tradeoffs has been pointed out for
example in (Pu & Chen 2005).
In a tool with an explicit preference model, o4 will be
determined as the best option once both hidden preferences
have been added. However, the user might need to be mo-
tivated to ask for these options by seeing suggestions that
point them out as opportunities.
Consider first the strategy of proposing options with ex-
treme attribute values proposed by Linden et al. (Linden,
Hanks, & Lesh 1997). For the departure time, o5 is the ear-
liest and o6 the latest departure. Are these good suggestions
to make the user understand the opportunities offered by the
available options? Consider:
• unless the arrival has to be after 17:30, o3 is a much
cheaper, thus more attractive option than o5.
• unless the arrival has to be before 9:00, o2 is much more
attractive than o6.
Showing these as suggestions would give the user an impres-
sion that a different arrival time implies significant compro-
mises on her preference for low cost, which in reality is not
true. Thus, she might never state her preferences on time
given these suggestions.
The strategy of showing maximally diverse options gives
the same result: as o1 is the best option, the options that are
most different are again o5 and o6. We have already seen
that these are not the best to motivate preferences on arrival
time, but they are not motivating for other attributes either:
• if the user prefers the CITY over the INTernational air-
port, o3 is a much cheaper option that already allows this.
• if the user prefers airline A, o2 allows this at a much lower
cost.
The model-based suggestion strategy takes this observation
into account by evaluating options with respect to others that
might dominate them. The following table shows the nor-
malized differences δi to the attribute range of the dominat-
ing options as well as the probability p of breaking domi-
nance with all of them, assuming that the user has a proba-
bility Pai of 0.5 of having a preference on each of the three
attributes that do not yet have a preference.
fare arrival δ2 airport δ3 airline δ4 p
(a1) (a2) (a3) (a4)
o1 250 14:00 - INT - B - -
o2 300 9:00 0.5 INT 0 A 0.5 0.437
o3 350 17:30 0.35 CITY 0.5 B 0 0.381
o4 400 12:30 0 CITY 0 B 0 0
o5 550 18:30 0.1 CITY 0 B 0 0.05
o6 600 8:30 0.05 CITY 0 A 0 0.025
We can see that now, options o2 and o3 are considered the
best suggestions. This is due to the fact that they are quite
competitive given the known preference on price, and show
the availability of other attribute values without unduly com-
promising the already known objectives. Thus, they are most
likely to stimulate the additional preference expression that
we require.
Note that the best option - o4 - is not among the sugges-
tions. However, it will become the highest-ranked option
once the hidden preferences have been stated. This illus-
trates that the function of suggestions is to motivate addi-
tional preferences, but not necessarily to provide the best
choices by themselves.
Evaluation with User Studies
We carried out a user study to validate the hypothesis
that obtaining preferences incrementally through example-
critiquing increases decision accuracy over the form-filling
approach. We also wanted to confirm that the presence
of suggestions was important. The study used FlatFinder,
a tool for finding student accommodation using example-
critiquing.
We performed two experiments. The main experiment
was carried out among 3 different groups of users, each
using a different tool for their search with no previous ex-
posure to the options. A second experiment was a within-
subject experiment where the same subjects who had used
the form-filling tool also used the example-critiquing tool.
This was mainly used to confirm that the first evaluation re-
sult did not carry any user bias.
Between-Group Experiment
The between-group experiment used 20 users in each of the
three groups. They were students looking for new or better
housing and thus were very motivated to carry out the ex-
periment. Each group used one of the three versions of the
FlatFinder system:
1. a form-filling interface similar to that used in existing
web sites such as http://www.comparis.ch/. The
form contains all preferences that can be used when
Version Accuracy Average Time
Form-filling 0.25 2:45
Iterated form-filling 0.35 5:30
example-critiquing 0.45 8:09
example-critiquing 0.70 7:39
(with suggestions)
Table 1: Accuracy and task execution time for different ver-
sions (between-groups experiment).
searching for housing, and the tool returns 6 options that
best fit the preferences;
2. the example-critiquing interface, where preferences are
stated on the user’s initiative. The tool returns 6 best op-
tions according to the current preferences;
3. the same example-critiquing interface, but returning 3
best options and 3 best suggestions according to the prob-
abilistic suggestion strategy.
The subjects first selected the most preferred options us-
ing their respective version of the FlatFinder tool. For the
first group, we recorded both the best option selected in the
first use, and after iterated use of the form-filling. At the
end of the experiment, we asked the subjects to carefully go
through the entire list of available options (about 150) and
select their truly most preferred choice, a process that took
them on average about 30 minutes. We can thus measure
the decision accuracy as the fraction of times that the choice
found using the tool agrees with that found during this de-
tailed examination. This measure, also called the switch-
ing rate, is the most widely accepted measure of quality for
product search tools in the marketing literature (see for ex-
ample (Haubl & Trifts 2000)).
The results of the experiment are shown in Table 1. They
clearly show the variation in performance for the different
versions of the tool. Using the traditional form-filling ap-
proach, only 25% of users found their most preferred solu-
tion. This fraction only increased to 35% when they could
repeat the use of this interface as many times as they liked.
On the other hand, example-critiquing reached a 45% ac-
curacy. However, the improvement is not statistically sig-
nificant: the student test gives values of p=0.097 for the dif-
ference between form-filling and simple example-critiquing,
and p=0.265 for repeated form-filling and simple example-
critiquing.
We obtained the strongest increase in accuracy, to 70%,
when using example-critiquing with suggestions. This dif-
ference is strongly statistically significant with p=0.00176
for single form-filling and p=0.0133 for repeated form fill-
ing. This shows that suggestions are critical in improving
decision accuracy for example-critiquing tools.
However, as Table 1 also shows, the increased accuracy
comes at the expense of a longer interaction time. Partly
this is due to the fact that users were not familiar with the
example-critiquing interface and thus took some time to get
used to it. Interestingly, example-critiquing with sugges-
tions required less interaction time than without suggestion
but achieved much higher accuracy, which is another indica-
Version Accuracy Average time
Form-filling 0.25 2:45
Form with revision 0.35 5:30
example-critiquing 0.65 6:02
(with suggestions)
Table 2: The accuracy achieved by users of the different ver-
sions (within-subject experiment).
tion of the importance of suggestions.
We attribute the poor performance of form-filling to the
fact that people were driven to state many preferences before
having considered any of the available options. Subjects that
used the form-filling approach started with an average of 7.5
preferences, and only 5 of 20 ever removed any of them.
In contrast, subjects that used example-critiquing with sug-
gestions started with an average of only 2.7 preferences, but
added an average of 2.6 to reach 5.3 preferences at the end
of the interaction. Here, half of the preferences were con-
structed while considering examples, and the results suggest
that they were much more accurate.
(Pu & Chen 2005) reported the significant influence of
value tradeoffs, reflected as preference revisions, on deci-
sion accuracy. Here, we observe similar correlation: people
who found their target item made 6.93 preference revisions
on average, whereas those who did not find their item made
an average of only 4.51 revisions. The difference is statisti-
cally significant with p=0.0439. This confirms a similar cor-
relation, even though our tool did not provide specific sup-
port for tradeoffs and revisions as was used in (Pu & Chen
2005).
Within-Subject Experiment
To ensure that the differences in accuracy were not due
to the different backgrounds and preference fluency of the
users interacting with the tool, we also carried out a within-
subject experiment where the same group of 20 users first
used the form-filling version, the iterated version, and finally
the example critiquing version with suggestions. Note that
to avoid overloading the subjects, we did not test example-
critiquing without suggestions.
Table 2 shows the resulting accuracy and interaction time.
We attribute the slightly lower accuracy and interaction time
for example-critiquing to the fact that users were tired dur-
ing a second interaction, and thus less likely to perform a
deep interaction with the tool. The results however clearly
show that example-critiquing gives a very significant im-
provement in decision accuracy. The student test has a sig-
nificance of p=0.00506 that example-critiquing with sugges-
tions provides more accuracy than single form-filling, and
p=0.03 that it provides more accuracy than repeated form-
filling.
Conclusion
Web users are commonly faced with the task of searching
for their most preferred item using a search tool. Most tools
on the WWW require users to express preferences by filling
forms, and then provide the best matching solutions. While
this approach works well for decision makers who know
their preferences before the interaction, it does not support
the process of preference construction for users who are not
familiar with the choices.
We have shown the incremental approach of prefer-
ence construction via example-critiquing and demonstrated
through user studies that it provides much higher decision
accuracy than the form-filling approach. It appears that
when users are asked to state their preferences without con-
sidering the options, many of these preferences are simply
inaccurate. Since users are reluctant to retract them, this
leads to inaccurate search results. On the other hand, signif-
icant gain in accuracy can be achieved by the use of active
suggestion strategies to stimulate preference expression and
increase its fluency.
With this group of participants, we have also confirmed
the results of Pu and Chen (Pu & Chen 2005) that a higher
decision accuracy is achieved by users who perform more
preference revisions. We are considering ways to combine
active tradeoff support with the incremental preference elic-
itation we use here to see if even higher accuracy can be
obtained.
For operators of e-commerce sites, more accurate search
tools should help increase consumer satisfaction, attract
more repeat visitors, and increase conversion rate and rev-
enue.
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